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The history of the philosophy of physics has been shaped by a complicated and fascinating interplay between physics, philosophical ideas and external factors. This history is not only a intriguing subject for study in its own right: historical considerations can also shed light on the content of doctrines put forward by philosophers and are relevant for the appraisal of such doctrines. The aim of this paper is to illustrate this general point by a case study, namely the introduction by Hans Reichenbach of the notorious Conventionality Thesis regarding simultaneity in relativity theory.
 
There is an, admittedly old-fashioned, standard lore concerning the history of the conventionality thesis that goes more or less like this. At the end of the 19th century empiricism in the philosophy of physics had got the wind in its sails as a result of the work of Ernst Mach, and this empiricist Machian atmosphere decisively influenced Einstein’s thinking. In his 1905 paper that established special relativity Einstein​[1]​ accordingly adopted an empiricist and even operationalist stance. In particular, when Einstein discussed spatiotemporal notions he declared that in order to make such concepts physically meaningful we have to endow them with concrete physical content in terms of measuring procedures. For example, in the case of time at a particular place the sought definition of time (Einstein’s term) can be given as “the position of the hands of a clock situated at the same spot”. Time thus defined is a purely local concept, however, so that we need a further definition to compare times at different places. For this reason Einstein famously asked himself how to synchronize clocks. He answered this question by asserting that simultaneity is by definition (italics used by Einstein) achieved when all clocks are set such that the velocity of light, measured with their help, is the same in all directions. With this, the characterization of time in a frame of reference becomes complete: given one standard clock, its time can be propagated everywhere by means of the simultaneity relation.

Einstein emphasized the words ‘by definition’ in his description of the synchronization procedure. Indeed, the temporal and spatial notions introduced earlier in his article do not yet fix the simultaneity relation, due to the fact that we cannot determine the speed of any signal if we are not yet able to compare times at different locations. If we did know the speed of some signal, that of light for example, we could simply synchronize clocks by sending a light signal from one clock to another and by taking into account that this signal takes a time L/c to reach its destination (with L the distance between the clocks and c the speed of light). The situation being what it is, however, it seems that we need to stipulate a synchronization procedure that fixes both simultaneity and the speed of light. Stipulations cannot be true or false, so simultaneity and the value of the speed of light come out of this analysis as not having a fact-like, but rather a conventional character. This latter statement should not be interpreted in the trivial sense that we have to choose units for time and length before we can say anything about the value of the speed of light: even after we have made a choice for such units it is still undecided what the speed of light along any given direction is. For although it is true that we can measure the round-trip velocity, by determining how much time it takes for the light to travel from clock A to clock B and back again, this will not tell us how much time was needed to go one way, from A to B. In particular, it is impossible to establish that the to and fro light speeds between A and B are equal. 

If these things can only be stipulated, then it should also be possible to make other choices without coming into conflict with the facts already fixed by prior definitions. This point was worked out in a philosophically precise manner, the standard story continues, by Hans Reichenbach, especially in his epoch-making book The Philosophy of Space and Time (1928)​[2]​. Reichenbach there subsumed his investigation of simultaneity under a general analysis of the status of physical notions, according to which all independent concepts should be coordinated to concrete physical things and procedures by means of ‘coordinative definitions’. Reichenbach emphasized, in line with general logical empiricist doctrine, that this coordinatization is fundamentally conventional in character: like all coordinative definitions, the definition of simultaneity is arbitrary​[3]​.
The standard story thus tells us that there is a Leitmotiv of empiricist and operationalist considerations both in the development of special relativity itself and in the philosophy of space and time linking up with relativity. The most emblematic element of this story is the account it gives of the conventionality of relativistic simultaneity. This Thesis of the Conventionality of Distant Simultaneity not only encapsulates the empiricist philosophy that is intimately connected with relativity theory, it also relates directly to the drastic revision of temporal notions that is essential for the theory itself. 

This standard account has not gone unchallenged. In particular after the appearance of Michael Friedman’s Reconsidering Logical Empiricism​[4]​, it has become outdated to treat the early work of Reichenbach and other logical empiricists as a direct continuation of Mach-like empiricism. It is now well documented that at least Reichenbach’s own version of logical empiricism originated from neo-Kantian considerations and that it was only under the influence of Moritz Schlick that Reichenbach after 1920 came to speak about his coordinative definitions (first proposed by him as neo-Kantian synthetic a priori principles) as arbitrary conventions. 

In this paper I shall follow Friedman’s lead, with a special eye to the specific case of the conventionality of distant simultaneity. The question I shall attempt to answer is whether a more detailed and more historically informed account of the development of Reichenbach’s position than the one provided by the standard story can shed new light on the Conventionality Thesis. It is undeniable that Reichenbach, after his discussion with Schlick, explicitly and repeatedly claimed that distant simultaneity is conventional; but did he mean exactly the same thing as other conventionalists and later commentators, and was he fully consistent? I shall argue that on closer analysis traces of Reichenbach’s earlier neo-Kantian stance become visible, and that these create an unresolved tension in Reichenbach’s position. To start with I shall have a look at Einstein’s own supposedly operationalist and conventionalist position in 1905---the place where the whole conventionality debate has its origin. Partly drawing on another paper​[5]​, I shall argue that one should not read an operationalism-based conventionalism into Einstein’s statements of 1905 and later.     

2. Einstein and the Definition of Space and Time

The emphasis laid by Einstein in his 1905 paper on the need to define our notions of space and time before we can even start to do physics certainly suggests operationalist sympathies. However, we should note that the 1905 paper is not the only place where Einstein expresses himself in this fashion: remarkably, he refers to the need for definitions of physical concepts even in contexts in which he explicitly opposes operationalist and logical empiricist ideas. For example, in his Autobiographical Notes we find Einstein reminiscing about the discovery of special relativity with the following words​[6]​: 

“One had to understand clearly what the spatial co-ordinates and the temporal duration of events meant in physics. The physical interpretation of the spatial co-ordinates presupposed a fixed body of reference, which, moreover, had to be in a more or less definite state of motion (inertial system). In a given inertial system the co-ordinates meant the results of certain measurements with rigid (stationary) rods. …..  If, then, one tries to interpret the time of an event analogously, one needs a means for the measurement of the difference in time… A clock at rest relative to the system of inertia defines a local time. The local times of all space points taken together are the ‘time’ which belongs to the selected system of inertia, if a means is given to ‘set’ these clocks relative to each other”.

This is an almost verbatim repetition of the relevant passages from the 1905 paper, including the use of the term ‘define’, and with the explanation that space and time coordinates mean what is indicated by rods and clocks; and all this without any accompanying comment that might indicate that Einstein in the nineteen-forties deemed some kind of qualification of his 1905 statements necessary. So we may safely assume that Einstein is here expressing the same view as the one he had in mind in his original relativity paper.  

This is striking because elsewhere in these same autobiographical notes, and also in Einstein’s ‘Replies to Criticism’ in the same volume​[7]​, we find an explicit and strong rejection of Bridgman’s operationalism and Reichenbach’s empiricism as viable philosophies of science. For example, about Bridgman’s operationalism Einstein protests​[8]​: 

“In order to be able to consider a logical system as physical theory it is not necessary to demand that all of its assertions can be independently interpreted and ‘tested’ ‘operationally’; de facto this has never been achieved by any theory and can not at all be achieved. In order to be able to consider a theory as a physical theory it is only necessary that it implies empirically testable assertions in general”. 

Einstein made the same point in greater detail in his Reply to Reichenbach. In his contribution to the Einstein Volume, Reichenbach had stated that the philosophical lesson to be learnt from relativity theory was that basic physical concepts must be given meaning by means of ‘coordinative definitions’: it is only the ‘coordination’ of a concrete physical object or process to the concepts in question that bestows physical significance on them. As Reichenbach wrote​[9]​: 

“For instance, the concept ‘equal length’ is defined by reference to a physical object, a solid rod, whose transport lays down equal distances. The concept ‘simultaneous’ is defined by the use of light-rays which move over equal distances. The definitions of the theory of relativity are all of this type; they are coordinative definitions”. 

Reichenbach continued by explaining that this definitional character of basic physical concepts implies that they are arbitrary: 

“Definitions are arbitrary; and it is a consequence of the definitional character of fundamental concepts that with the change of the definitions various descriptional systems arise. … Thus the definitional character of the fundamental concepts leads to a plurality of equivalent descriptions.  .. All these descriptions represent different languages saying the same thing; equivalent descriptions, therefore, express the same physical content.” 

In his response Einstein objected that any concrete physical object is subject to deforming forces, and can therefore not be used to define concepts. We need a theory of these deforming influences in order to be able to correct for them, and such a theory already uses a notion of length. Therefore, we must have an idea of what ‘length’ is prior to the use of any actual measuring rod. From this Einstein concludes that a concept like ‘equality of length’ cannot be defined by reference to concrete objects at all; such concepts “are only indispensable within the framework of the logical structure of the theory, and the theory validates itself only in its entirety”​[10]​. The unit of length can only be supposed to be realized by an imaginary ideal rod, which can at its best be approximated by a concrete object---and this only on the condition that we are thinking of the concept of length in circumstances in which it makes sense to assume the existence of rods at all! Actual rods have thus to be adjusted on the basis of theory, and this means a reversal of order compared to the analysis that begins with operational definitions and starts constructing a theory only afterwards. 

Another though related point stressed by Einstein is that macroscopic devices like rods and clocks do not have a foundational role to play in the interpretation of fundamental physics. The reference to them only serves practical purposes: it makes contact with familiar everyday circumstances and thus directs our thoughts. Making this use of them is only a tentative manoeuvre, “with the obligation, however, of eliminating it at a later stage of the theory”​[11]​. 

So when we look at the historical evidence in a more detailed way, it becomes very plausible that by his use of the term definition in 1905 Einstein did not want to imply that we are dealing with arbitrary meaning stipulations that must precede theory construction​[12]​. The very same point can be made with respect to the notion of simultaneity. There is in fact a remarkable continuity in Einstein’s utterances from the early twenties onwards, when he first explicitly addresses philosophical questions relating to space and time. In these philosophical writings Einstein consistently rejects the project of defining concepts along the lines of operationalism or logical empiricism. The striking fact that Einstein uses the term ‘definition’ to refer to the content of spatiotemporal notions even in this context illustrates that he did not realize the extent to which this term is able to excite philosophers and can give rise to misunderstandings. In itself this is quite understandable: Einstein’s papers on special relativity are evidently physics papers, addressed to a physicist audience. Einstein was facing the task of convincing his readers that the spatiotemporal concepts of classical physics were not beyond discussion and that, indeed, certain changes in these concepts would make it possible, in a surprising manner, to consistently combine the two postulates of relativity theory. He attempted to demonstrate that actual measurements (of the usual kind, traditionally employed to determine spatiotemporal relations) did not prove the sole applicability of the classical notions. In particular, it was important for Einstein to make it clear that there was no empirical support for the absoluteness of simultaneity, nor for the pre-relativistic idea that the to and fro velocities of light have to differ in almost all inertial systems (namely those moving with respect to absolute space). The interdependence that Einstein notes between simultaneity and the value of the speed of light is employed by him to consistently apply the same synchronisation procedure, with the same value of the speed of light, in all inertial systems. This is a quite different project than arguing that these notions are arbitrary in any single frame of reference. 

Einstein’s special theory of relativity has served as a beacon for twentieth-century philosophy of science; but quite a few commentators have misinterpreted the philosophical implications of the theory. As Howard​[13]​ correctly concludes, it was only with the downfall of logical empiricism, and the Quinean criticism of the analytic/synthetic distinction, that philosophy of science caught up with Einstein’s thinking about the status of physical concepts. Reichenbach’s discussions of relativity have certainly contributed to the misunderstandings. His analysis of the notion of simultaneity in particular has been instrumental in reinforcing the idea that special relativity should be seen as both the fruit and victory of a strictly empiricist philosophy of science. 

However, Reichenbach’s ideas are sophisticated and complex, and as we shall see they leave room for the supposition that different, conflicting conceptions were competing for priority in his thinking; not all of which fit in with the standard reading of his work. This complicated character of Reichenbach’s ideas can be brought out by looking at their interesting history. 

3. Reichenbach, Relativity Theory and the Apriori

Hans Reichenbach was one of the students attending Einstein’s first relativity course at the University of Berlin in 1919; a year later his Relativity Theory and Apriori Knowledge (Relativitätstheorie und Erkenntnis A Priori)​[14]​ appeared. As the title indicates, the problematic Reichenbach was dealing with in this work was the relation between Kantian philosophy and relativity. When one reads the book it very soon becomes evident that Reichenbach is not at all attacking Kant’s epistemology from an empiricist point of view, using Einstein’s theory as an ally---as one might expect on the basis of the lore that sees a direct empiricist link going from Mach via Einstein to Reichenbach. Quite on the contrary, Reichenbach sets himself the task of salvaging as much as possible of Kantian doctrine, given the problems the theory of relativity admittedly causes for it​[15]​. In his first chapter Reichenbach notes that according to special relativity the temporal order between two events is not unique in all cases: for events with spacelike separation this order depends on the choice of a frame of reference. Indeed, the simultaneity relation associated with a given inertial frame of reference determines which one of the two events is earlier; going from one frame to another means adopting different judgements about which events are simultaneous; in the case of spacelike events this change may reverse the temporal order of the events. This result is in complete contrast to Kant’s doctrine of the reine Anschauung, according to which it is a priori certain that all possible events are embedded in one unique temporal series. But Reichenbach stresses that the existence of this conflict does not imply the downfall of the Kantian approach. For according to Reichenbach Kant was certainly right in pointing out that a priori elements are absolutely indispensable in any empirical investigation: we need to avail ourselves of concepts before we can even start studying nature.  

What Reichenbach is thus arguing in 1920 is the inevitability of a ‘constitutive a priori’, consisting of a network of concepts and principles that make it first of all possible to get a grip on any field of research and that in this way ‘constitute’ the field. But this conceptual framework can and will change in the course of time: it is possible to develop and adapt our concepts in response to unexpected relations between empirical data and the emergence of new theoretical ideas. The contribution of human reason is therefore not given once and for all, as originally claimed by Kant, but consists in evolving principles by means of which we order the data of experience. Kant’s doctrine of the a priori should accordingly be split up into a constitutive and an apodictic component: the constitutive a priori must be retained whereas the apodictic part, which says that the concepts furnished by intuition have permanent and absolute validity, should be rejected. Reichenbach’s manoeuvre here is typical of neo-Kantianism: Relativitätstheorie und Erkenntnis A Priori can be considered a neo-Kantian discussion of relativity theory, close in spirit to the Marburg school (Cassirer et al.). 

It is natural to ask how this evolution of our concepts should be thought of in detail, and Reichenbach pays explicit attention to this question. One might imagine, given the rejection of the apodictic significance of the a priori, that completely free conceptual changes can be made in the face of tensions in the network of our knowledge. But this is not the way Reichenbach deals with the issue in 1920. Instead, he argues that there is an important principle governing conceptual development, namely the principle of what he calls ‘continuous extension’ (stetige Erweiterung): our conceptual network is adapted in a piecemeal fashion, so that central, well-embedded elements remain unchanged and only the most ‘marginal’ ones undergo revision. Although in principle all our concepts may eventually change under the influence of new empirical findings, in practice some of them are virtually immune to such revision. Think, in particular, of the concepts used for describing daily experience: these will not change as a result of the evolution of science since they are so utterly central in our existing conceptual framework and indispensable for making contact with already existing knowledge. This principle of continuous extension makes it possible to relate new theories to older ones and, importantly, it justifies us in performing observations in which we implicitly use older theories. 

So, even granted that there is no a priori foundation of our conceptual framework in the sense of a rock bottom with eternal validity, only those notions will actually change that are not linked up with direct ‘un-theoretical’ observation; the notions that change are those needed to deal with situations directly affected by the new theories. The better a concept is embedded in the network of concepts used to describe situations that are not directly touched by theoretical development, the less changeable it is. 

Reichenbach gives several examples​[16]​. For instance, in ordinary measurements of lengths and times we do not need to take into account relativistic contractions and dilations, not even if the eventual goal is to test predictions of relativity theory itself. And if we look through a telescope, in order to test the predictions of general relativity, we may forget about the fact that according to general relativity in the telescope itself light does not propagate along Euclidean straight lines. Although general relativity theory necessitates drastic changes in the arsenal of concepts needed to describe the universe at large, and although the observations made with a telescope are of undoubted relevance for this cosmological description, the telescope itself and the findings arrived at with its help can be described with notions from classical pre-relativistic physics, which in turn coincide to a large extent with everyday concepts. Without this continuity of description and the approximate validity of older theories we would be at a loss in connecting our new theories with earlier observations.    

4. The Flexibility of the Notion of Simultaneity

When we apply these rather conservative ideas about the evolution of concepts to the particular case of distant simultaneity we are led to an account along more or less the following lines. First of all, what we most directly measure are local quantities, since we ourselves are spatiotemporally local creatures that respond to local stimuli. The observation of the hands of a clock here and now is an example of such an immediate local measurement. Like all observations, also such direct ones must employ constitutive principles; but these are of a very robust kind, centrally embedded in our language and practice. For all practical purposes, the concepts relating to direct local observations are therefore immune to revision under theory change. 

When it comes to the comparison of events that take place at a distance from each other, however, observations become less direct. It is true that classical theory provides us with standard procedures for making such comparisons, and in particular for establishing simultaneity at a distance, but it is not immediately obvious that these procedures can be consistently applied also within the context of the new theory---and to the extent that they can, it is not self-evident what the properties of the resulting simultaneity relation will be. Here we clearly find ourselves at a place in the network of concepts which is less central, less directly linked to observation, and therefore offering more room to flexibility and revision. This is good news, for it turns out that the concept of simultaneity has to become different from its classical counterpart if the two postulates of special relativity (the relativity postulate that says that all inertial frames have equal status and the light postulate that says that the velocity of light is has a constant value that is independent of the velocity of the emitting source) are to be consistent---this follows deductively from the two postulates, as demonstrated in Einstein’s 1905 paper. 

In other words, in the initial stage of Reichenbach’s philosophical discussion of relativity the emphasis is on the possibility of concept change in the transition to new theories. This process of conceptual evolution is interpreted as a continuous process of adaptation, which stays as close as possible to the already existing framework. The  flexibility that is required is just the room needed to make the new theory possible at all; in the case of simultaneity this would lead to the standard relativistic simultaneity relation used by Einstein (corresponding to the synchronization procedure described in section 1), which deviates from the classical simultaneity relation in that different inertial observers will come to different conclusions about which events are simultaneous but is identical, qua synchronization procedure, to classical simultaneity in the ether frame (in relativity theory there is no such preferred frame, and in accordance with the relativity postulate the same procedure is applied in all inertial frames). 

One may introduce the term ‘conventionality’ in this context: the concepts that are open to revision are those not completely fixed by the central, more robust concepts and the facts formulated with their aid. In this sense they are non-factual, conventional. We can decide to adjust them without coming into conflict with direct, local findings. But this type of conventionality only serves to create room for the new (frame-dependent) relativistic concept of simultaneity and has little to do with the much stronger conventionality thesis that surfaces less than two years later in Reichenbach’s work.

5. The Reichenbach-Schlick Exchange and the Conventionality of Simultaneity

After the appearance of Relativity Theory and Apriori Knowledge, still in 1920, Reichenbach sent a copy of his book to Moritz Schlick. Schlick responded positively in a brief letter, after which a more extensive exchange developed. This correspondence, which has received much attention in the philosophical literature​[17]​, apparently had a great impact on Reichenbach: after it Reichenbach rephrased his position completely.  

In his letters Schlick takes Reichenbach to task for paying too much tribute to Kant. According to Schlick, it is exactly the combination of the apodictic and constitutive aspects that is characteristic of Kant; separating these two aspects in the way Reichenbach has done leads to a distinctively non-Kantian stance that rather accords with empiricism. Schlick admonishes Reichenbach to avoid misunderstandings about his alliances and to eschew Kantian terminology: one should use the term ‘convention’, à la Poincaré, instead of speaking about ‘a priori constitutive principles’. As Schlick writes in his letter of 26 November 1920​[18]​: 
 
“The central point of my letter is that I cannot find out what the difference really is between your a priori principles and conventions, so that we seem to agree on the essential issue. What has amazed me most in your manuscript is that you dispose of Poincaré’s conventionality doctrine in only so few words”.​[19]​

In his reply​[20]​ Reichenbach objects that he term ‘convention’ may create the misunderstanding that there is no factual content in scientific statements. He points out that there is no straightforward arbitrariness in the a priori principles, because they cannot be conventionally changed individually, one by one. It is only the total system of such principles that can be said to admit empirically equivalent alternatives, and then still the set of alternatives is restricted (compare the discussion of geometry cum physics, G + F, below). As Reichenbach stresses, such a combination of principles represents an objective PROPERTY (Reichenbach’s capitals) of reality​[21]​. A little bit earlier in the same letter he had expressed ‘a profound distrust’ (ein starkes Mißtrauen) about whether the choice between such alternative (i.e., empirically equivalent) systems can be made on the basis of considerations of simplicity (as Schlick, like Poincaré, would maintain); and he had also reported ‘an instinctive aversion’ (eine instinktive Abneigung) to the idea that such a choice is only a matter of pragmatics---he proposed to suspend judgment on this complicated issue.  

But Schlick retorts on 11 December​[22]​ that Poincaré was of course aware of such and similar complications, and concludes that a far-reaching agreement between himself and Reichenbach has now been reached​[23]​. Indeed, Reichenbach from this point on starts declaring that scientific concepts are fixed by ‘coordinative definitions’, which ‘like all definitions’ are arbitrary. In the very beginning this is still occasionally mixed with references to the constitutive role of such definitions, but after 1922 there is no mention anymore of the constitutive a priori​[24]​. There are recurring warnings, though, also in Reichenbach’s later work, against possible misunderstandings caused by the term ‘conventionalism’. Concepts possess the status of a convention, because of their definitional character, but this does not mean that statements formulated with their help lack factual content; the designation ‘conventionalism’ is therefore unfortunate, Reichenbach repeatedly declares​[25]​. 
In The Philosophy of Space and Time we find Reichenbach’s full articulation of the idea that distant simultaneity in relativity theory is such an arbitrary convention. As Reichenbach explains​[26]​, to determine the simultaneity of distant events---by synchronizing two clocks A and B---we need to know the velocity of a signal (for example a light signal) connecting the clocks, but to measure such a velocity we require prior knowledge of the simultaneity of distant events, so that we get caught in a vicious circle. He concludes: 

“The occurrence of this circularity proves that simultaneity is not a matter of knowledge, but of a coordinative definition, since the logical circle shows that a knowledge of simultaneity is impossible in principle. We also notice that the second characteristic of a coordinative definition, namely its arbitrariness, is satisfied. It is arbitrary which time we ascribe to the arrival of the light ray at B”.

A little bit further on the same page (p. 127) we find the passage in which Reichenbach expresses this conventionality by means of his famous ε formula. Discussing the just-mentioned logical circle in any attempt to synchronize clocks A and B by sending light from A to B and back again, he writes:
“It is this consideration that teaches us how to understand the definition of simultaneity given by Einstein, t2 = t1 + ½ (t3 – t1),  which defines the time of arrival of the light ray at B as the mid-point between the time that the light was sent from A and the time that it returned to A. This definition is essential for the special theory of relativity, but it is not epistemologically necessary. Einstein’s definition, too, is just one possible definition. If we were to follow an arbitrary rule restricted only to the form t2 = t1 + ε (t3 – t1), 0 < ε < 1, it would likewise be adequate and could not be called false.”  

So Reichenbach appears to have been completely convinced by Schlick that the concepts of theoretical physics in the final analysis have to be defined by ostention and possess the status of free stipulations (at least, this is how Reichenbach interpreted Schlick; see note 23). Reichenbach will rehearse this point of view explicitly and emphatically in several later publications, for example---as we have already seen---in his contribution to the 1949 Einstein volume.

6. Coordinative Definitions versus Constitutive Principles 

The analysis in terms of conventional definitions as adopted by Reichenbach after his exchange with Schlick has the great advantage that it can easily be presented and argued: it is simple, systematic, logically neat and clear. However, in section 2 we already noted that this account does not accord with the actual practice of physics: individual theoretical concepts are not strictly defined by means of concrete empirical procedures---the relation between theory and experiment is of a more holistic nature. Of course, this observation has later become one of the essential points of criticism of logical empiricism in general (as we have noted, Einstein can be regarded as a precursor here). Remarkably, however, also in Reichenbach’s own work there are signs that there were other conceptions in the back of his mind that struggled with his ‘arbitrary coordinative definitions’ account. 

In section 2 of his 1924 book Axiomatization of the Theory of Relativity, entitled The Logical Status of the Definitions, Reichenbach distinguishes between two kinds of definitions, conceptual and coordinative. Conceptual definitions clarify the meaning of a concept by establishing relations with other concepts. If we only possessed such definitions, however, we could not do physics but would remain caught in an abstract conceptual network without empirical content, as in mathematics. We therefore need ‘physical’ definitions as well. Reichenbach formulates it like this​[27]​: “The physical definition takes the meaning of a concept for granted and coordinates it to a physical thing: it is a coordinative definition”. Therefore, coordinative definitions presuppose conceptual definitions (as is explicitly declared by Reichenbach a little bit later on the same page). But this can only mean that physical concepts must already have meaning and be part of a network of interrelated concepts and principles before any ‘coordination’ can take place; and this introduces an element of theoretical holism in their content. 

We can see how this works out in detail when we look at Reichenbach discussion of the conventionality of geometry in The Philosophy of Space and Time. He notoriously does so via the consideration of deforming forces (already introduced in his 1922 and 1924 publications), instead of by focussing directly on the arbitrariness of the definitions of length and congruence as one would expect. He explains that actual measuring rods cannot be used for the definition of the unit of length: we have to count in the possible presence of forces that affect their length. Apparently, we already know a lot about the meaning of ‘length’, ‘rod’ and ‘force’ before the coordination, and this alerts us to the complication of the interrelations between these concepts; in physical terms, the possibility that distorting forces are present. Now, there is a systematic procedure for detecting the presence of some of these forces, namely the ‘differential’ ones. These affect different materials differently, so that we can compare rods of different chemical constitution, find regularities in their various responses to the force field, and finally make corrections for the differential effects. This, again, brings out that Reichenbach thinks of his coordinative definition for length in terms of a theoretically determined, ideal measuring rod that can only be approximated by an actual object. Now there is a further complication​[28]​: universal forces, which act on objects in the same way regardless of their chemical composition, cannot be detected via the just-mentioned procedure. Since only the combination G + F of geometry and physics leads to testable statements, this means that we can have different geometries, combined with different physical theories (differing from each other by positing different universal forces), that lead to exactly the same empirical predictions. This, then, is a case of global theoretical underdetermination, in which the theoretical framework (in this case the division of labour between G and F) fails to be completely determined by empirical data.  The different geometries G say different things about which distances are equal to each other---but they agree on the conceptual meaning of length and congruence in the sense that they all say that the unit of length is everywhere realized by an ideal, undeformed measuring rod.

The important point here is that in this analysis of the non-uniqueness of the geometrical description the basic idea is not that we are free to stipulate whatever definition of congruence we happen to like. Rather, it is taken for granted that congruence is implemented by the transport of an ideal and undeformed measuring rod; the non-uniqueness of the geometry now derives from the underdetermination by empirical data of the physical theory that specifies the magnitude of the universal length deformations. Consequently, if there is conventionality here it is not the conventionality associated with the arbitrary character of stipulative, ostensive definitions. Instead we are dealing with a global kind of conventionality, associated with the underdetermination of the total theoretical system. In The Philosophy of Space and Time Reichenbach proposes to opt for the system that sets the universal forces equal to zero (F = 0), on the grounds that this choice leads to more ‘descriptive simplicity’ (not because it would be ‘more true’). He adds​[29]​: “This conception of the problem of geometry is essentially the result of the work of Riemann, Helmholtz, and Poincaré and is known as conventionalism.”  

On closer inspection Reichenbach’s conventionalism thus turns out to be more sophisticated than suggested by the motto “all definitions are arbitrary”. In fact, that the unity of length is given by an undeformed measuring rod is handled by Reichenbach as something that is ‘unconventionally’ given a priori, before any empirical investigation can even begin. A global network of concepts specifying the relation between lengths and deforming causes is already in place, and this network plays a role comparable to that of the combination of constitutive a priori principles in Reichenbach’s earlier work. Something similar can be said about Reichenbach’s discussion of simultaneity. If the conventionality of simultaneity really were based on a supposed complete arbitrariness typical of all definitions, we would expect that no restriction at all would have to be imposed on the temporal coordination of events at different spatial positions (with respect to a given frame of reference). However, Reichenbach does restrict the conventionality of simultaneity by the requirement that the ε in his formula lie between 0 and 1. The background of this requirement can be found in sections 21 and 22 of The Philosophy of Space and Time, where Reichenbach introduces what he calls the ‘topological coordinative definition of time order’: “If E2 is the effect of E1, then E2 is called later than E1”​[30]​.  Remarkably, here Reichenbach refrains from any mention of the arbitrariness of this definition. On the contrary, he emphasizes how close this ‘criterion’ (as he alternatively calls the definition) is to everyday experience and practice: “The procedure which we have described is used constantly in everyday life to establish a time order”​[31]​. 

Reichenbach now clarifies his restriction on ε: we should evidently not take two events as simultaneous if one of them is later than the other, and this implies that ε must be between 0 and 1. He adds: “Simultaneity means the exclusion of causal connection” and “The concept simultaneous is to be reduced to the concept indeterminate as to time order”​[32]​. There is then no complete arbitrariness in the meaning of simultaneity after all! Apparently there are principles that already fix the meaning of the concept, as in the case of length. This situation reminds us of the principle of continuous extension and the constitutive a priori in The Theory of Relativity and Apriori Knowledge. As in this earlier neo-Kantian work, Reichenbach assumes that there are global and general principles that regulate the use of spatial and temporal concepts. 

Of course, if simultaneity indeed precisely means ‘impossibility of causal connection’, it follows from relativity theory that there is not one unique event at spatial position B that is simultaneous with a given event at position A. All events with spacelike separation from the given event qualify, so that a finite interval rather than a point-event is singled out as simultaneous with the event at A. This consequence is hailed by Reichenbach​[33]​, because it creates room for the relativity of simultaneity (i.e., the result of relativity theory that whether or not two events are simultaneous depends on he frame of reference with respect to which the simultaneity relation is considered). As he writes: “Our epistemological analysis thus leads to the discovery that the relativity of simultaneity is compatible with the intuitive conception which we connect with simultaneity. It is not this conception which is incorrect, but the conclusion derived from it that simultaneity must be uniquely determined.” This statement is striking for two reasons. First, Reichenbach here concedes that the concept of simultaneity is given meaning via antecedent notions (‘the intuitive conception’) that can be maintained to be correct. Second, it now becomes clear why it is important for Reichenbach to restrict the meaning of simultaneity to exactly ‘lack of causal connectibility’ and why he does not want to consider any additional meaning ingredients. As he states, if it would follow from the already given meaning of simultaneity that exactly one event at B---instead of a whole interval---would be simultaneous with any given event at A, it would be impossible to accommodate the special relativistic relativity of simultaneity. This argument, however, is mistaken. There is no harm in adding more intuitive notions to the meaning of simultaneity, and to fix one event at B as simultaneous with the event at A, if this is done in a frame-dependent way so that it is going to depend on the frame exactly which event is the uniquely chosen one. This is in fact the standard approach in relativity theory, and in the next section we shall see that this approach can be fitted into ideas that accord not only with actual physics but also with the ‘holistic’ strand in Reichenbach’s own approach.

There is a clear parallel between the constitutive a priori principles of 1920 and the global elements in Reichenbach’s later work. For example, in 1920 Reichenbach counts Euclidean geometry among the constitutive principles that in classical physics (but no longer in general relativity and in accelerated frames in special relativity) govern the meaning and use of the physical concept of congruence. The procedure of continuous extension weakens this to a local principle in the case of general relativity and accelerated frames; the global geometry will in these cases generally become non-Euclidean. After 1920---an early example is Reichenbach’s 1922 paper The Philosophical Significance of the Theory of Relativity​[34]​---Reichenbach still holds that the global geometry implicitly defines the meaning of congruence. In other words, the analysis is still top-down, going from the theoretical framework to individual concepts​[35]​. It is true that there is now no longer an a priori specification of the global geometry; Reichenbach now stresses that the geometry is underdetermined, because of the possible presence of undetectable universal forces. According to Reichenbach this underdetermination entails that the choice between different geometries is in principle arbitrary (he advises to adopt the option F = 0, but emphasizes that this is a merely pragmatic choice). 

Conventionality and arbitrariness are therefore located on the level of global theory choice, linked to the theoretical underdetermination of the total theory. That underdetermination thus implies arbitrariness will probably not be accepted by most modern philosophers of science. But whatever position one takes on the question whether theory choice in such circumstances is conventional, arbitrary, purely pragmatic or not, once a choice has been made the theoretical framework functions as constitutive of the field of experience in the same way as the 1920 constitutive principles. There therefore still is a ‘relativized a priori’, relative to an evolving conceptual framework. Possibly we have to say that this theoretical framework contains important pragmatic elements---but whether this entails that the constitutive principles of the earlier 1920 neo-Kantian position were epistemically more robust and more ‘truth-like’ is not easy to answer. After all, questions about the truth of the categories or a priori principles are distinctly un-Kantian. 


7. The Holistic Approach in Practice: Minkowski’s Analysis of Space and Time

As it turns out, there actually exists an approach to relativity theory that is explicitly along the holistic lines we have outlined above. Although this seems not to have been noticed in the literature, Minkowski’s famous 1908 lecture Raum und Zeit​[36]​ incorporates several of the ideas that are central to Reichenbach’s 1920 book---and of which some, as we have argued, can also be found in his later work. 

Minkowski starts his construction of what he calls ‘the objective world’ by describing elementary, local physical phenomena in terms of arbitrarily chosen coordinates; he then performs transformations on the resulting equations to bring them in a simple and symmetrical form; and finally he introduces spatial and temporal concepts as embodied in that system of reference in which the equations take their desired global ‘standard’ form. The laws and equations Minkowski actually considers are those of Maxwell; but he makes it clear that he assumes that all laws of nature, including those yet to be discovered, e.g. those responsible for the stability of matter, will exhibit the same global spacetime symmetry properties as Maxwell’s equations. In Minkowski’s approach space and time are thus determined on the basis of considerations about the global form of the physical laws that represent the regularities and patterns in the physical phenomena, starting from a description of local events. The concepts needed to give this local description are assumed to be given beforehand, but for the global space and time determinations this is not the case and the task is accordingly to fix them via theoretical considerations.

In some more detail, Minkowski first introduces completely arbitrary coordinates in order to label events: x, y, z and t. The events in question are to be thought of as physical occurrences that happen locally to small material systems, specks of matter. The patterns among these events should now be captured by mathematical equations, laws, still expressed in the arbitrary coordinates x, y, z and t. The task then is to transform these laws such that they conform to certain form requirements, desiderata that are specified beforehand but that clearly are inspired by empirical knowledge as formalized in earlier theories. In particular, the equations should be brought into a standard form that displays spatial homogeneity and isotropy, the equivalence of inertial frames, etc. Minkowski himself describes his procedure as follows​[37]​: 

“From the totality of natural phenomena it is possible, by successively enhanced approximations, to derive more and more exactly a system of reference x, y, z, t, space and time, by means of which these phenomena then present themselves in agreement with definite laws”. 

The reference to the totality of natural phenomena should be noted here. We are not dealing with local data that are pasted together by means of arbitrary conventions, but we are looking at global patterns in the world and use ‘a priori’ principles (in a relativized sense!) to simplify their formulation. Concepts like spatial congruence and simultaneity are subsequently derived from this holistic analysis: the congruence and simultaneity relation are implicitly defined by the physical laws in their standard form.

Minkowski finds, of course, when he determines the standard inertial spatiotemporal coordinates this way, that there is no uniqueness. There are infinitely many solutions to the problem, corresponding to the infinitely many possible inertial frames of reference. In all these frames the laws take the same standard form. This means, in particular, that spatial congruence and simultaneity become frame-dependent. So there is the familiar relativity of simultaneity in the sense of frame-dependence; but conventionality in the sense of arbitrariness within any one frame does not emerge in a natural manner.

8. Conclusion: Holism and Reichenbach’s Conventionalism

In Minkowski’s approach the relativistic simultaneity relation thus emerges as part of a total theoretical package satisfying global symmetry requirements. As emphasized also by Reichenbach​[38]​, the existence itself of such an isotropic and homogeneous description of nature is a contingent matter of fact. Although within the limits of applicability of special relativity we can give all physical laws a form in which they assign identical physical properties to all points in space and time (their standard ε = ½ form), such a symmetrical description does generally not exist in more complicated spacetimes. In fact, most general-relativistic spacetimes do not allow a consistent global ε = ½ simultaneity relation. The standard simultaneity relation therefore reflects, and is adapted to, an objective global symmetry property that is typical of special relativistic spacetime. 

It can be argued nonetheless that even in special relativity it remains a matter of our choice whether or not we make use of this property, whether we choose a theoretical description that is adapted to the global symmetry. Reichenbach’s conventionalism can be defended this way. Indeed, as we have seen, Reichenbach’s conventionalism is different from the ‘arbitrariness of definitions’ conventionalism that assigns an arbitrary meaning to each individual term. The latter brand of conventionalism is a local affair; the former has a global, holistic character. Although Reichenbach in many places proclaimed that the local approach constituted the backbone of his conventionalism, in fact he turned out to be committed to holistic ideas that in several respects remind us of his 1920 position and permit only a conventionalism relating to the choice between theories. 
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